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Eurasian penduline tits (Remiz pendulinus) have an unusually diverse breeding system consisting of
frequent male and female polygamy, and uniparental care by the male or the female. Intriguingly,
30 to 40 per cent of all nests are deserted by both parents. To understand the evolution of this diverse
breeding system and frequent clutch desertion, we use 6 years of field data to derive fitness expectations
for males and females depending on whether or not they care for their offspring. The resulting payoff
matrix corresponds to an asymmetric Snowdrift Game with two alternative evolutionarily stable strat-
egies (ESSs): female-only and male-only care. This, however, does not explain the polymorphism in
care strategies and frequent biparental desertion, because theory predicts that one of the two ESSs
should have spread to fixation. Using a bootstrapping approach, we demonstrate that taking account
of individual variation in payoffs explains the patterns of care better than a model based on the average
population payoff matrix. In particular, a model incorporating differences in male attractiveness closely
predicts the observed frequencies of male and female desertion. Our work highlights the need for a new
generation of individual-based evolutionary game-theoretic models.
Keywords: cooperation; Snowdrift Game; evolutionary game theory; evolutionarily stable strategy;
nest desertion; sexual conflict
1. INTRODUCTION
Decisions about parental care are among the most
important life-history decisions that animals face.
Across vertebrates, a diversity of parental care systems
exists, ranging from cooperative breeding with biparen-
tal care and helpers, such as in meerkats (Suricata
suricatta [1]) and long-tailed tits (Aegithalos caudatus
[2]), to limited (or no) parental care, such as in preco-
cial birds and many fish species [3–5]. The fitness
consequences of parental care decisions depend on
the social and non-social environment [3,5–7], and
strongly reflect the trade-off between investment in
the current brood and investment in future survival
and reproduction [3,8,9]. Although both parents have
a shared interest in their current brood, there is con-
flict between them because each individual would
prefer its mate to provide the majority of parental
care [5,9,10].
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful approach for
studying cooperation and conflict in a coherent frame-
work [11,12], and it has often been used to model
parental care decisions [13–18]. With a few notable
exceptions [19,20], most published parental care models
are conceptual and not directly tailored to a specific
empirical system. Attempts to test theoretical predictions
have focused primarily on biparental care, examining how
a parent responds to its local circumstances and the par-
ental effort of its mate [21–23]. Realistic game-theory
models for the interactions between parents involved in
biparental care have to consider how such behavioural
interactions may depend on individual traits and environ-
mental variables, and how the outcome of the interactions
may change over time. This makes the models and their
solutions inherently intricate [13,16]. Furthermore,
model predictions are often sensitive to their specific
assumptions [13]; so, for accurate tests of care models,
it is particularly important to validate the underlying
theoretical assumptions.
Testing models of parental care might be easier in sys-
tems that are not restricted to biparental care, but have a
polymorphic pattern of care. In systems with uniparental
care by either the male or the female parent, for
instance, a decision about parental care may be more
manifest than in systems with biparental care (e.g.
desert the offspring versus a mere reduction in feeding
rates, respectively), and the consequences more pro-
nounced (e.g. sequential reproduction with multiple
mates within one season versus resources saved for
winter survival and/or reproduction in a following breed-
ing season). Therefore, in systems with uniparental care,
one may be better able to quantify individual-based
reproductive payoffs associated with a given strategy.
* Author for correspondence (r.van.dijk@sheffield.ac.uk).
† Present address: Department of Animal and Plant Sciences,
University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK.
Electronic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1098/rspb.2011.2297 or via http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org.
Proc. R. Soc. B (2012) 279, 1927–1936
doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.2297
Published online 21 December 2011
Received 1 November 2011
Accepted 1 December 2011 1927 This journal is q 2011 The Royal Society
Several species of vertebrates exhibit a combination of
male-only, female-only and biparental care within the
same population [24–26]. Here, we focus on the
Eurasian penduline tit (Remiz pendulinus), in which
male-only care, female-only care and biparental desertion
all occur within the same population [27,28]. Full incu-
bation and feeding of nestlings are carried out by only
one parent. In our study population in southern Hungary,
45 per cent of all nests are cared for by the female alone,
16.7 per cent are cared for by the male alone and 38.3
per cent are deserted by both parents [29]. Biparental
care is never observed. Despite large geographical dis-
tances and substantial variation in breeding density and
other ecological variables, this pattern of care is consistent
across five populations of penduline tits in distant
locations in Europe [29] (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1).
The diverse care pattern in penduline tits, in particu-
lar the high frequency of nest desertion, is probably the
result of sexual conflict between the two parents
[28,30,31]. One parent is able by itself to incubate the
clutch and feed all the nestlings until independence
[32,33], giving each parent an incentive to desert the
nest. Nest desertion puts the deserted partner in a diffi-
cult situation (a ‘cruel bind’ [34]): even if uniparental
care is costly, the deserted partner has a strong incentive
to stay, because deserting as well would condemn the
offspring to death. Nevertheless, the deserted partner
may also leave the nest if desertion is associated with
higher fitness expectations than continuing to care for
the current brood [35]. Game-theory models show
that sexual conflict over parental care can indeed
result in biparental desertion, or in uniparental care
and an associated arms race for being the first
to desert [36].
Our objective here is to apply these game-theoretic
concepts to a particularly well-studied wild population
of Eurasian penduline tits, in which males and females
may have up to six mates in a single breeding season
[28]. Based on 6 years of data from this population, we
estimate for both males and females the fitness conse-
quences of caring for the offspring or deserting the nest.
Using these estimates, we calculate a payoff matrix,
from which we derive the evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) for each sex. We show that the resulting ESS pre-
dictions do not explain the variation in parental care
observed in the field. We argue that this is because the
average payoff matrix for the population gives a poor rep-
resentation of the conflict faced by each pair of penduline
tits, which is likely to depend on their individual charac-
teristics. We therefore investigate the possibility that
variation in care patterns is caused by individual variation
in payoffs [37]. By incorporating individual variation, we
can account better for population-level patterns of par-
ental care. Finally, we incorporate an individual
plumage trait, male ‘mask’ size, which may be associated
with such individual variation in payoffs as it predicts the
likelihood for males to desert the clutch [38,39]. This
further improves the predicted population-level patterns
of care. Throughout, we discuss the difficulties of apply-
ing simple payoff matrices to real populations with
substantial individual variation, and argue that evolution-
ary models should aim to take a more realistic approach
by modelling individual variation.
2. ESTIMATING PAYOFFS
(a) Study site and data collection
We studied Eurasian penduline tits during the breeding
season between April and August in six consecutive
years (2002–2007) at a 1321 ha fishpond system,
Fehe´rto´, in southern Hungary (468190 N 20860 E). Each
year, 41–116 ringed males and 15–51 ringed females
bred at this site [28]. The male bias in the number of
ringed individuals reflects the fact that females are more
difficult to trap than males, rather than a genuine bias
in population sex ratio. Males were usually trapped
before incubation using mist nets, whereas females were
usually trapped at the nest during incubation. We
searched for nest-building penduline tits and then visited
each nest roughly every 2 days [40] to determine the date
of nest initiation, date of pair formation, number of eggs
(between the sixth and the ninth day after the start of
incubation; median, eighth day), date of desertion, iden-
tity of the parent attending the nest and the number of
nestlings (10 days after hatching of the first egg; the
number of nestlings on the tenth day after hatching is
highly correlated with the number of fledglings [39,40]).
Adults were trapped and ringed with one metal ring and a
unique combination of three colour rings (A. C. Hughes,
Middlesex, UK). Standard biometric measurements
were taken, as well as digital photographs of each side
of the bird’s head to quantify the size of the eye-stripe
or ‘mask’, which previously we found to indicate male
attractiveness (see [38,39] for details). The pattern of
nest desertion in our population did not differ between
nests where neither parent was trapped and those where
at least one of the parents was trapped (multinomial
logistic regression: x2 ¼ 3.932, d.f. ¼ 2, p ¼ 0.140, n ¼
389 nests), suggesting that trapping did not influence
the probability of desertion. Adult return rates between
years are low (5% for males, 2% for females [41]). To
avoid pseudoreplication, we randomly selected data
from only one season per colour-ringed individual,
giving a total sample of 337 nests from 172 individuals.
The composition of pairs was nearly always different
between subsequent clutches: out of 194 colour-ringed
pairs that produced a clutch between 2002 and 2007,
only six pairs (3.1%) kept the same mate between succes-
sive nests (for further details on fieldwork, see Szentirmai
et al. [28]). The pattern of parental care for these six pairs
(50% female-only care, 10% male-only care and 40%
biparental desertion) did not appear to differ from that
observed at the population level.
(b) Fitness consequences of care and desertion
Throughout this paper, we focus on parental care or
desertion decisions concerning each individual’s first
breeding attempt in the season. Since incubation and
nestling feeding take about 34 days [42], caring for
the first brood severely constrains the opportunities for
subsequent breeding (table 1a). To estimate the contri-
bution of the first clutch to parental fitness, we
calculated the average number of eggs and nestlings for
all nests that were initiated before 6 June, depending on
the parental care category (female-only care, male-only
care and biparental desertion) of the nest (table 1a).
The cut-off date corresponds to the midpoint of the inter-
val between the nest initiation date of the first and second
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nest of ringed males (mean+ s.d. between males:
3 June+22.7 days, n ¼ 267 males; and 8 June+21.1
days, n ¼ 101 males, respectively). If a given individual
had more than one nest before 6 June, we selected only
the earliest nest in the season as its first nest.
Our data on first clutches are in line with previous
studies of penduline tits [28,29]. Nest desertion takes
place during the egg-laying phase. If the male deserts
first, the female often lays two or three additional eggs, so
that female-only cared clutches are significantly larger
than those cared for by males and those deserted by both
parents (table 1a). In biparentally deserted nests, all off-
spring die, whereas offspring survival (i.e. survival from
hatching until 10 days after hatching) does not differ
between male-only and female-only cared clutches (binary
logistic regression including parental care category, clutch
size, egg-laying date, year and the interaction between par-
ental care category and clutch size as fixed effects: x2¼
1.458, p¼ 0.227, n¼ 142 nests; A´. Poga´ny, R. E. van Dijk,
P. Horva´th & T. Sze´kely 2008, unpublished data). The
reproductive success of males may be inflated (or deflated)
by the occurrence of extra-pair young; in this system, about
24 per cent of all offspring are sired by an extra-pair male
[43]. However, the percentage of extra-pair young does not
differ between nests cared for by themale and those deserted
by him, nor between nests cared for by the female and
those deserted by her [43]. Therefore, extra-pair paternity
is unlikely to bias our results.
The data on first broods within a season were based on
115 nests for which the parental care category was known.
For 172 ringed birds (111 males and 61 females) involved
in successful breeding attempts at these nests, the par-
ental care category of their first nest of the season could
be determined (‘successful’ meaning that pair formation
and egg laying took place). For each combination of sex
(male, female) and parental care category (male-only
care, female-only care and biparental desertion), we cal-
culated the percentage of birds involved in a second
Table 1. (a) Summary of breeding parameters of Eurasian penduline tits in southern Hungary: number of eggs and nestlings
produced in all first nests (including those of both ringed and unringed individuals) of the breeding season, with sample size
(number of nests) between parentheses; the probability for ringed individuals to have at least one more successful breeding
attempt after the first successful nest (‘successful’ meaning that pair formation and egg laying took place); the number of
subsequent successful breeding attempts; the total number of eggs and nestlings produced in all subsequent nests; and the
seasonal reproductive output (mean+ s.d.). Standard deviation of the total number of nestlings represents the pooled
standard deviations of the first and subsequent nests. (b) Population strategy-dependent seasonal reproductive payoffs for
males and females: mean number of nestlings+ s.d. for males (below the diagonal) and females (above the diagonal) given
the parental category of their first nest in the breeding season (n is the number of individuals). FC, female care; FD, female
desertion; MC, male care; MD, male desertion. Arrows point from smaller to larger payoffs, representing the direction in
which selection for a parental care strategy would act. Dashed arrows indicate our assumption that unilateral desertion always
yields a higher fitness payoff than caring (see §3b); continuous arrows are based on observed values. This matrix is consistent
with that of the Snowdrift Game (see table 2e). n is the number of individually marked males or females, whereas sample
sizes at the first nests of the season (in parentheses) are the number of nests including those of both ringed and unringed
individuals. Sample sizes for the former may be larger than that for first nests only, because reproductive success for some
nests was estimated using population means for a given strategy (see §2b).
female-only care male-only care biparental desertion
(a) F C F C F C
first no. of eggs 6.37+1.16 (41) 3.17+1.27 (12) 2.84+1.27 (51)
no. of nestlings 3.63+2.00 (40) 2.20+1.40 (10) 0+0 (65)
subsequent p-value 0.74 0.38 0.06 0.67 0.34 0.83
no. of nests 1.46+1.39 0.58+0.91 0.06+0.24 0.67+0.58 1.17+1.20 1.33+0.82
no. of eggs 6.34+6.05 2.61+3.97 0.06+0.24 2.91+2.90 4.49+4.66 7.12+5.00
no. of nestlings 2.07+2.58 0.95+1.70 0+0 1.02+1.77 1.54+2.54 2.35+2.90
total no. of nestlings 5.70+3.26 4.58+2.62 2.20+1.40 3.22+2.26 1.54+2.54 2.35+2.90
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successful breeding attempt and the mean number of sub-
sequent nests established by those birds. Males may only
care for one brood in a breeding season, whereas females
may care for up to two broods. The difference between
males and females in the probability of having a sub-
sequent successful nest after providing parental care
(0.06 for males versus 0.38 for females; table 1a) is largely
due to the fact that males often care near the end of the
breeding season [28,44]. Additionally, males who
deserted their first nest were less likely to have a sub-
sequent successful nest if the female had also deserted
(p ¼ 0.34) than if she had stayed behind to provide care
(0.74; table 1a). This might suggest that males at nests
that are biparentally deserted are of lower quality and/or
less attractive. However, mask size was not different
between males whose nest was deserted by both parents
and males at nests where either the male or the female
provided care (binary logistic regression: model effect
estimate+ s.e. ¼ 1.025+0.912, Wald statistic ¼ 1.262,
d.f. ¼ 1, p ¼ 0.261, n ¼ 88 males). Tarsus length, wing
length and body mass of males were also not different
between these two categories of nests (p . 0.331).
Additionally, at the second nest in a season, the pattern
of parental care for males was not different from that
observed at the population level (table 3b) if his first
nest was cared for by the female (x2 ¼ 0.211, p ¼ 0.900,
n ¼ 34 males) or was biparentally deserted (x2 ¼ 1.186,
p ¼ 0.553, n ¼ 31 males). This suggests that the breeding
experience of males did not predict the likelihood of
biparental desertion of a subsequent nest.
Based on all penduline tits within a category (i.e. includ-
ing those birds that did not establish a second nest), we
calculated the average number of eggs and nestlings pro-
duced during subsequent breeding attempts (table 1a). If
the number of eggs and/or nestlings could not be deter-
mined, it was estimated as the population mean of nests
with the corresponding parental care category (male-only
care: 3.67 eggs and 2.22 nestlings; female-only care: 5.80
eggs and 3.07 nestlings; biparental desertion: 2.93 eggs
and 0 nestlings; neggs¼ 371 nests and nnestlings ¼ 194
nests). Overall, we estimated reproductive success for 77
of 339 clutches (22.7%) and for 33 of 336 broods (9.8%).
Table 2. Reproductive payoff matrices. For comparing alternative actions, arrows point from smaller to larger payoffs
(indicating the expected direction of selection). (a) Generic version; our central assumption is that unilateral desertion yields
a higher payoff for the deserting partner (both male and female) than biparental care (a behaviour we never observed in our
population), i.e. b . a and B. A. (b–e) Four specific scenarios for the different relationships between the payoffs when
caring alone (c for males, C for females) and when both parents desert (d for males, D for females).
(a) 













c < d and C > D
single ESS: female-only care
(c)
c > d and C < D





c < d and C < D 
single ESS: biparental desertion
Prisoner’s Dilemma
(e)
c > d and C > D
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Finally, we calculated the seasonal reproductive output
for each parental category, by adding up the average
number of nestlings in the first and subsequent nests
(table 1a). To check the consistency of our calculations
of parental strategy-dependent seasonal reproductive
output, we also determined the total number of nestlings
produced over the season by the 172 ringed penduline
tits, separately for males and females in each care category
of their first nest. For all six categories, the reproductive
output of the colour-ringed penduline tits that we fol-
lowed throughout the breeding season was almost
identical to that in table 1a.
3. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
(a) No individual variation in payoffs
The seasonal reproductive output given in the penulti-
mate row of table 1a corresponds to the total number of
nestlings shown in the payoff matrix for the parental
care categories in table 1b. A male who cared for the off-
spring in his first nest produced more nestlings over the
course of the season (2.20+1.40) than a male whose
first nest was biparentally deserted (1.54+2.54;
Mann–Whitney U-test: U ¼ 257.5, p ¼ 0.009, n ¼ 65,
Cohen’s d ¼ 0.878, 12 b ¼ 0.88). In contrast, a female
who cared for the offspring in her first nest did not pro-
duce significantly more nestlings over the course of the
season (4.58+2.62) than a female whose first nest was
biparentally deserted (2.35+2.90; U ¼ 93.5, p ¼ 0.108,
n ¼ 58, d ¼ 1.120, 1 2 b ¼ 0.70). Note, however, that
we had only six females in the latter category.
Pairs rarely produced multiple clutches together (see
§2a [39]). We therefore assume that penduline tits play
a single-shot game with two alternative actions: care or
desert. An influential single-shot game from the game-
theoretic literature is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this
Table 3. (a) Payoff requirements, parental care evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) and the probability (%) for each ESS.
The question mark (?) indicates the percentage of pairs involved in a Snowdrift Game for which neither of the two ESSs
(male-only care or female-only care) was payoff-dominant. (b) The expected population strategy for three different
assumptions for ‘?’, i.e. the sum of the proportion predicted by payoff dominance and the proportion predicted by the
Snowdrift Game.
(a)




c > d and C < D
male-only care
20.1










c > d and C > D
Snowdrift Game
49.5
b > c and C > B
female-only care
26.4












(b) female-only care (%) male-only care (%) biparental desertion (%)
observed parental care+CI (n ¼ 534 pairs) 47.4+ 8.6 13.5+ 6.0 39.1+ 8.4
if ? ¼ biparental desertion 47.8 (21.4 þ 26.4) 23.5 (20.1 þ 3.4) 28.7 (9.0 þ 19.7)
if ? ¼ female-only care 67.5 (21.4 þ 26.4 þ 19.7) 23.5 (20.1 þ 3.4) 9.0 (9.0)
if ? ¼ 50% male-only care and 50% female-
only care
57.6 (21.4 þ 26.4 þ 9.9) 33.4 (20.1 þ 3.4 þ 9.9) 9.0 (9.0)
if ? ¼ biparental desertion and attractive
males desert
49.1 (24.4 þ 24.7) 8.6 (7.5 þ 1.1) 42.3 (22.6 þ 19.7)
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game, each player may either cooperate or defect, but the
best response to any action by the opponent is to defect
[45–48]. Thus, the Prisoner’s Dilemma characterizes a
situation in which cooperative behaviour is vulnerable to
exploitation by non-cooperators, eventually leading to
an equilibrium in which no one cooperates. Despite the
high frequency of nest desertion in penduline tits, table 1b
suggests that desertion is not the dominant strategy: if
the male deserts, the female does best by caring, whereas
if the female deserts, the male does best by caring. Thus,
penduline tits do not appear to be playing a Prisoner’s
Dilemma at the population level.
An alternative possibility is the Snowdrift Game, in
which cooperation is beneficial for both players but the
costs of cooperating depend on the opponent’s strategy
[49–51]. This is also true for parental care. Because par-
ental care is an asymmetric game between two types of
players, namely males and females, the game in table 1b
may reflect an asymmetric Snowdrift Game (cf. ‘Battle
of the Sexes’ [52]). Although in asymmetric games an
ESS can never be a mixed strategy [53], the asymmetry
(male versus female) may be used to settle the conflict:
each of the ESSs, corresponding to the two forms of uni-
lateral cooperation (i.e. male-only care and female-only
care), may be viewed as a convention. Although either
convention is evolutionarily stable once it is adopted by
the whole population, the problem of which one will be
reached in the course of evolution remains. Both players
agree that unilateral cooperation would be best, but
they differ in which of the two ESSs they prefer.
If one of the ESSs is payoff-dominant [54]—in that the
payoff to each player is at least as great as the payoff it
would get at the alternative ESS—then an obvious solution
is to adopt that ESS. In terms of the average reproductive
payoffs in our dataset, female-only care is more profitable
for both sexes than male-only care (table 1b), and thus
female-only care is the payoff-dominant ESS. However,
the predicted outcome of female-only care is inconsistent
with the observed behaviour. Why is it that some pairs
exhibit male-only care, when female-only care apparently
gives a higher payoff for both sexes? And if the parents
coordinate their actions, why do we still observe such
a high frequency of biparental desertion (28–44%;
electronic supplementary material, figure S1)?
(b) Individual variation in payoffs
Because individuals vary in their fitness prospects, a
payoff matrix based on reproductive outputs averaged
across the whole population may provide a poor frame-
work for understanding conflict resolution within
individual pairs. Although at a population level penduline
tits appear to be playing a Snowdrift Game, individual
pairs of birds may differ in their payoffs from particular
actions and may bargain an outcome depending on
their individual traits (and their particular environmental
circumstances). Within each pair, individual character-
istics such as attractiveness or condition are likely to
affect the payoff for a given parental category. If a male
is attractive, for instance, his female partner may be
more willing to care for his offspring [55], while the
male may benefit more from desertion by finding a
new mate more rapidly than a less attractive male. Simi-
larly, males may be more willing to care for the
offspring of fecund females, while those females may be
better at producing additional clutches. But accounting
for such individual differences to generate precise, pair-
specific predictions of the outcome of individual conflicts
over parental care is a very difficult task.
Nevertheless, using the available field data on repro-
ductive output for three of the categories (though never
biparental care) for some of the birds may allow us to gen-
erate more accurate predictions than when we consider
only the population average payoff matrix. Here, we use
an approach based on bootstrapping. The game played
by each pair is represented by the general payoff matrix
shown in tables 2a and 3a. Note that in our study popu-
lation not a single case of biparental care was observed at
the 534 nests we investigated; so the payoffs A and a
cannot be estimated for any individual. Instead, we
assume that unilaterally deserting a caring partner
always yields a higher fitness payoff than caring (i.e. b. a
and B. A). For all other outcomes (male-only care,
female-only care and biparental desertion), we allow the
expected payoffs to vary between individuals.
For most pairs, we lack individual payoffs for both the
male and the female; so, as an approximation, we used a
bootstrapping approach to generate a large sample of
payoff matrices from the field data. This involved ran-
domly drawing (with replacement) from the observed
individual payoff values (seasonal number of nestlings)
for each parental care category for males and females.
Each bootstrapped matrix was composed of the following
values randomly drawn from the corresponding observed
payoffs: one b value drawn from the n ¼ 46 observed male
payoffs under female-only care; one c value from the n ¼
18 male payoffs under male-only care; one d value from
the n ¼ 47 male payoffs under biparental desertion; one
B value from the n ¼ 3 female payoffs under male-only
care; one C value from the n ¼ 52 female payoffs under
female-only care; and one D value from the n ¼ 6
female payoffs under biparental desertion. To each of
these values, we added a small amount drawn from a
random normal distribution with mean 0 and s.d. 0.01.
This was to preclude the occurrence of tied payoffs,
which would otherwise be common in the biparental
desertion category since many of these individuals
produced no offspring in the breeding season. We
repeated this process until we had generated 5000
unique bootstrapped matrices from the field data.
There are four possibilities (table 2b–e) for the type of
parental care game being played by a pair, determined by
the particular values of c, d, C and D:
(i) c , d and C . D: a game in which female-only
care is the only ESS;
(ii) c . d and C , D: a game in which male-only care
is the only ESS;
(iii) c , d and C , D: a Prisoner’s Dilemma where
biparental desertion is the only ESS; or
(iv) c . d and C . D: a Snowdrift Game with two
ESSs (male-only care and female-only care).
On the basis of our bootstrapped matrices, 21.4 per cent
of nests are predicted to have female-only care (case (i)),
20.1 per cent male-only care (case (ii)) and 9 per cent
biparental desertion (case (iii)), while the remaining 49.5
per cent of pairs will be involved in a Snowdrift Game
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(case (iv)) from which any of the three outcomes may result
(table 3a). In the Snowdrift Game, we assume that if one of
the two ESSs is payoff-dominant, this is the one the pair will
adopt. Thus, we assume that female-only care results when
b. c and C. B (26.4% of the bootstrapped matrices, in
addition to those from case (i)) and that male-only care
results when b, c and C, B (3.4% of the bootstrapped
matrices, in addition to those from case (ii); table 3a). For
19.7 per cent of the bootstrapped matrices, the male and
female are involved in a Snowdrift Game in which neither
equilibrium is payoff-dominant. We consider three possible
scenarios for how the conflict is resolved at these nests:
— Both parents desert the nest. This scenario predicts
an additional 19.7 per cent of nests with biparental
desertion (table 3b).
— The parents adopt the solution that is payoff-domi-
nant at the population level, namely female-only care
(table 1b). This scenario predicts an additional 19.7
per cent of nests with female-only care (table 3b).
— The two ESSs are adopted with equal probability,
resulting in female-only care at half of these nests and
male-only care at the remaining half [40]. This scenario
predicts an additional 9.9 per cent of nests with female-
only care and an additional 9.9 per cent of nests with
male-only care (table 3b).
Of these three scenarios for resolving the Snowdrift Game
in the absence of payoff dominance, the first (biparental
desertion) best predicts the observed patterns of care, as
this provides the closest match to the pattern of parental
care observed in our study population (table 3b). The pre-
dicted frequencies of female-only care (47.8%) and
biparental desertion (28.7%) are within the natural ranges
(electronic supplementary material, figure S1), although it
overestimates the frequency of male-only care (23.5%,
table 3b). This model, based on individual variation, is
therefore broadly consistent with the observed patterns of
care in our study population, and provides a better fit
than the earlier model based on the average payoff matrix
for the population (§3a), which predicted female-only
care at all nests.
To test how individual characteristics may influence
the resolution of conflict over care, we ran our boot-
strapped model again on a reduced sample of males, for
whom we knew the size of the mask (n ¼ 30, n ¼ 10
and n ¼ 40 males whose first nest in the season was
cared for by the female, cared for by the male or biparen-
tally deserted, respectively). Males with larger masks are
more attractive [38] and more likely to desert [39],
whereas the female’s decision to care or desert does not
appear to be influenced by the size of her partner’s
mask [39]. We therefore assumed that all males with a
larger-than-average mask (i.e. greater than 1.30 cm2;
n ¼ 120 males) would desert, whereas for males with
smaller masks we assumed that payoff dominance and
the Snowdrift Game would determine parental care as
outlined in table 3a. The predictions of parental care
from this model accounting for individual variation in
attractiveness closely resemble the observed pattern of
parental care in penduline tits (table 3b).
4. DISCUSSION
We found no evidence that penduline tits are playing a
Prisoner’s Dilemma, despite the high frequency of bipar-
ental desertion. At the population level, the payoff
matrix based on seasonal reproductive success is most
consistent with an asymmetric Snowdrift Game with
two alternative ESSs: female-only care and male-only
care. Female-only care is the payoff-dominant ESS,
but this fails to predict the patterns of care in the
wild, where more than half of the nests are either
cared for by the male (13.5%) or deserted by both
parents (39.1%). We argue that the population payoff
matrix is of little use in explaining observed patterns
of care because expected reproductive payoffs are likely
to vary between individuals, and therefore different
pairs may be playing very different games when deciding
whether to care or desert.
Our individual-based approach predicts a mixture of
parental care strategies, with frequencies of female-only
care and biparental desertion that fall within the observed
range in natural populations (table 3b, electronic
supplementary material, figure S1). Although largely con-
sistent with observed frequencies of parental care, our first
model overestimates the frequency of male-only care and
underestimates the occurrence of biparental desertion
compared with the empirical dataset (table 3b). In many
ways, this mismatch is not surprising, given that we
have payoffs only for a subset of individuals in specific
situations. Furthermore, we lack information on the
extent to which an individual’s expected payoffs are
correlated across the three different situations (male-
only care, female-only care and biparental desertion),
and on the correlation between the male and female pay-
offs of each pair. Such information is largely beyond our
reach, even for such an intensively studied field system
as this penduline tit population. Nevertheless, our
approach based on bootstrapped individual payoffs
highlights the importance of considering individual
variation when predicting the behaviour of individual
pairs instead of applying more conceptual models like
the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The significant deviation of this model from the
empirically observed pattern of care could be partly
owing to stochastic factors affecting some of the payoffs
based on small sample sizes. This may, for example,
have been responsible for the overestimate of the occur-
rence of male-only care, which was derived from only
n ¼ 18 payoffs for males and n ¼ 3 for females. But the
fact that males are more likely to provide care nearer
the end of the breeding season (yet without entailing
biparental care [27,43]), for instance, suggests that
there are other factors besides just the strategy-dependent
payoffs that are important in determining which parent
will provide care and which will desert.
The discrepancy between predicted and observed pat-
terns of care may be partly ascribed to individual
differences, such as individual quality or environment
[37]. To some extent, we took these individual-specific
effects into account by replacing the average fitness pay-
offs at a population level with individual payoffs.
However, a correlation between individual traits and the
different adopted strategies may cause a consistent bias
in the exact payoffs. Attractive males, for instance, may
desert not only when their partner stays behind to care
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for the offspring but also when the partner already has
deserted (as predicted in a Prisoner’s Dilemma), whereas
a less attractive male may be better off caring for the off-
spring in the latter case (as predicted in a Snowdrift
Game). Such covariance of individual traits with parental
care strategies is likely to influence the outcome of conflict
over parental care. In our final model, we accounted for
some potential correlations between individual traits and
reproductive payoffs by including the effect of male
attractiveness on the decision to care or desert, based
on our findings from earlier work [38,39]. We showed
that this substantially improved our model’s predictions,
bringing them closely in line with the empirically
observed pattern of care.
We assumed that the parents play a single-shot game
because normally each pair breeds together only once in
a breeding season, but in reality they are unlikely to play
a strictly single-shot game. Parents may interact multiple
times and repeatedly assess each other’s quality before
they decide whether to care for the offspring or desert.
Such interactive ‘negotiation’ behaviour probably influences
decisions over parental care [56]. However, although the
male’s own parental care decisions are known to be associ-
ated with his body condition or attractiveness, we have no
evidence that these male traits influence the parental care
decisions of females [38,44,57]. Additionally, it is worth
noting that Eurasian penduline tit parents spend little time
together at the nest during the period before desertion,
making detailed monitoring of each other’s behaviour,
such as has been suggested for St Peter’s fish [20], unlikely
[44]. Nevertheless, the interaction between individual traits
and environmental variables (e.g. mating opportunities)
may be complex, and experimental manipulations would
be useful for investigating systematically how these factors
combine to influence patterns of parental care.
Balshine-Earn & Earn [20] also showed in their
model that natural variation between individuals and in
the environment could promote the coexistence of differ-
ent forms of parental care (see also McNamara et al.
[48]). A spatially heterogeneous distribution of strat-
egies, such as desertion in high-quality habitats and
care in poor habitats, or vice versa, could potentially
confound the outcome of our analyses. Although it has
been suggested that spatially diverse environments
might favour multiple coexisting strategies [47], in ear-
lier work we found no relationship between parental
care category and habitat characteristics [41]. None-
theless, it would be worthwhile to investigate the
possibility that mating opportunities might be spatially
structured in some way, perhaps resulting in spatial vari-
ation in deserting strategies. Such extrinsic factors, the
reputation of the players in the game and occasional
mistakes made by those players may all influence conflict
resolution and allow multiple strategies to persist
[12,48,50,58].
In conclusion, we have shown that the resolution of
conflict over care is highly variable and may be strongly
influenced by individual differences in the expected
reproductive payoffs for each male–female pair. Using a
population payoff matrix to predict the behaviour of indi-
vidual pairs has severe limitations, because this is likely to
be a poor representation of the particular conflict faced by
each pair. We recommend the use of individual-specific
information on the reproductive consequences of
care decisions to obtain more accurate predictions of
population-level patterns of parental care.
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